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MRRSignal

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© 2026 MRRSignal

Trust

Seguridad

You are trusting us with a key to your payment provider and a figure you may want to keep private. This is exactly how both are protected.

Última actualización 18 de noviembre de 2026Qué cambió

Esta página se ofrece en inglés. Los encabezados están traducidos para que puedas orientarte.

2 sealsaround every stored provider key

AES-256-GCM under its own key, locked by AWS KMS.

The path of a key

How a provider key is storedA pasted key is checked to be live and, where the provider offers it, read-only; Stripe secret keys and test keys are refused. An accepted key is sealed with AES-256-GCM under a data key made for it alone, and that data key is sealed by a master key in AWS KMS, both bound to the account and provider. The stored row holds only the ciphertext, the sealed data key, the key id and a SHA-256 fingerprint. Separately, every admin action is written to an audit log with who, what and why.1 PasteYour provider keyrk_live_••••••••Shown once, never again2 CheckNarrowest key, live?rk_live_acceptedsk_live_refusedrk_test_refused3 SealMaster key, AWS KMSNever leaves KMS. A local key in developmentData key, 256-bitMade for this one key, stored only sealedAES-256-GCM9c 41 e7 0b d2 5f a8 3eBoth seals name your account and the provider4 StoreThe stored rowciphertextnoncewrapped_keykey_idcredential_hashThe fingerprint is SHA-256Audit trailEvery admin change, with who and why, in the same transactionuser.status_changedrevenue.sync_requestedstartup.hiddencontact.handled
From paste to storage. No admin role can read a key, and no screen or API response returns one. The ciphertext bytes are illustrative.

La versión breve

  • La clave más limitada posible. Solo lectura siempre que el proveedor lo ofrezca; rechazamos las claves secretas y de prueba de Stripe. Cada clave se comprueba antes de guardarse.
  • Cifrada en dos capas. AES-256-GCM con una clave propia, bloqueada por AWS KMS y vinculada a tu cuenta.
  • Las cifras privadas nunca salen de la API. Un listado que solo muestra el tramo no envía ninguna cifra a ningún navegador.
  • Cada cambio del equipo queda registrado. Los roles se comprueban en cada solicitud y cada cambio se registra con su motivo.

En esta página

  1. Claves de proveedores
  2. La clave más limitada, solo en producción
  3. Cifras que permanecen privadas
  4. Cuentas y sesiones
  5. Acceso del equipo y registro de auditoría
  6. Infraestructura
  7. Lo que no afirmamos
  8. Informar de una vulnerabilidad
  9. Versiones
En esta página
  1. Claves de proveedores
  2. La clave más limitada, solo en producción
  3. Cifras que permanecen privadas
  4. Cuentas y sesiones
  5. Acceso del equipo y registro de auditoría
  6. Infraestructura
  7. Lo que no afirmamos
  8. Informar de una vulnerabilidad
  9. Versiones

Provider keys

A provider key is the most sensitive thing we hold, so it gets the most care. The diagram above shows its path. In words:

  • Each key is encrypted with AES-256-GCM under a fresh 256-bit data key made for it alone.
  • That data key is encrypted by a master key in AWS Key Management Service and only the sealed copy is stored. The master key never leaves KMS. Development machines use a local key instead, and hold no real keys.
  • Both layers are bound to your account and the provider, so a stored row moved elsewhere cannot be decrypted.
  • The key is decrypted in memory only to read your subscriptions, and the data key is wiped from memory once used.
  • Errors from a provider are recorded without the request, so a key cannot end up in a log.
  • A SHA-256 fingerprint of each key stops the same key being connected to two accounts.
  • Disconnecting a provider deletes its key immediately.

Where to do it

Disconnect a provider in your connections, and its key is deleted at once.

The narrowest key, live only

We ask each provider for the narrowest access that can read subscriptions and prices. Where a provider offers keys that can only read, we accept nothing else. Of the 49 providers we support today, 14 offer such keys. Where a provider has no read-only keys, we use the key only to list subscriptions, and the connect screen says so before you paste it. Test and sandbox keys are refused everywhere, because they would let anyone claim invented revenue.

For exampleWhat we acceptWhat we refuse
StripeA live restricted key (rk_live_) that can read Subscriptions and PricesSecret keys (sk_), which can move money, and test keys
PaddleA live API key that can read subscriptions and pricesSandbox keys
RazorpayA live key ID (rzp_live_) and its secret. Razorpay has no read-only keys, so it is used only to list subscriptionsTest keys

Every key is tried against the provider before anything is saved. If it cannot read your subscriptions, nothing is stored. Every provider and the key it needs.

Figures that stay private

  • A founder who lists with a band only has their exact figure, history and growth withheld by the API itself. They are never sent to a browser, so they cannot be found in a page’s source.
  • Rooms receive a band, never a figure.
  • Statistics report no money for any group of fewer than three founders, and withhold totals that could be subtracted down to one founder’s private figure. Tests check both rules on every build.

En resumen

A band-only listing sends no figure to any browser, so there is nothing to find in the page source.

Accounts and sessions

  • Passwords are stored only as salted scrypt hashes.
  • An email address must be confirmed before it can be used to sign in, so nobody can register your address first.
  • Sign-in attempts are rate limited. Resetting a password signs that account out everywhere.
  • The API accepts short-lived signed tokens, valid for 15 minutes, and checks on every request that the account is still active, so a suspension takes effect at once.
  • Session cookies are HTTP-only, so scripts on the page cannot read them.

En resumen

Passwords hashed, email confirmed, API tokens valid for 15 minutes.

Staff access and the audit log

Staff use an admin console with roles: a moderator can handle chat reports but not change revenue, a support agent can manage accounts but not roles, and so on. Each request is checked against the database, so removing a role takes effect on the next click. No role can see a provider key.

Every change an admin makes, such as suspending an account, entering a reviewed figure, hiding a listing or removing a message, is written to an audit log in the same database transaction as the change itself, with who made it and the reason they gave. A change cannot happen without its record.

En resumen

Roles checked on every click. Every change logged with its reason. No role can see a key.

Infrastructure

  • All traffic to the site and the API uses TLS.
  • The database connection is encrypted and verifies the server’s certificate.
  • Chat messages are shown as plain text, and links in them are limited to http and https.
  • Sponsor cards link out with rel=“sponsored noopener”, and sponsors cannot run code on our pages.

What we do not claim

MRRSignal has not been audited for SOC 2 and holds no ISO 27001 or other certification, and we publish no uptime figure. The status page shows whether the service is up right now. If that changes, this page will say so, with the report.

Honestly

No SOC 2, no ISO 27001, no uptime figure. When that changes, the report will be here.

Reporting a vulnerability

If you find a weakness, write to [email protected] with what you found, how to reproduce it, and what an attacker could do with it. Our security.txt has the same address.

What we ask

  • Test only against your own account, and never read, change or delete anyone else’s data.
  • No denial of service, spam, social engineering of staff or founders, or physical testing.
  • Give us reasonable time to fix it before you tell anyone else.

What we promise

  • A reply from a person within three working days, and updates until it is fixed.
  • We will not take legal action against research done in good faith under these rules.
  • Credit on this page when it is fixed, if you want it.

We do not run a paid bug bounty at the moment.

Write to

[email protected]. A person replies within three working days.

Versiones

  1. 18 de noviembre de 2026
    Primera publicación.

Found something? Write to [email protected].